EU claims of “dismantling of rule of law” have remained key arguments against Orbán to this day. Pivotal moments of this conflict include the 2015 migration crisis, the launch of Article 7 procedure in 2018, or the blocking of Hungary’s RRF and Cohesion Funds under new conditionality mechanisms in 2021-2022. Whether it is through rule of law reports or infringement procedures, criticism of Hungary by the EU’s center-left and center-right majority in the European Parliament and Commission has become “business as usual”. 

In recent years, new points of conflict emerged around the war in Ukraine, including the EU’s sanctions against Russia and unconditional support for Ukraine. These have become the greatest points of division, but one can easily find older criticisms of Hungary present, as the recent controversy over the so-called transparency law showed. To Brussels, Orbán is a troublemaker, always resistant to adopting and implementing common EU policies, be it the new Migration Pact, sanctioning Russia, or enhancing support for Ukraine, all while failing to respect democratic and rule of law norms back home. 

The EU from Orbán’s point of view: political blackmail and pressure

Whether as a consequence or in conjunction, Hungary’s government and ruling Fidesz party have conducted multiple “anti-EU” campaigns, tactically blaming Brussels for various developments impacting Hungary. Notable examples include the migration crisis, the sanctions against Russia, and more recently the portrayal of Hungary’s leading opposition party, Tisza, as a puppet of an EU leadership wishing to remove Fidesz from power. 

The politicization of EU issues is not new or unique to Hungary, many parties throughout the Union do the same, but Hungary provides a clear example of how domestic and foreign policy can be intertwined. Hungary’s prime minister successfully leverages politicized EU attacks, and grounds his battles with the EU on issues where the Hungarian electorate is supportive of Orbán’s more conservative position (LGBTQ+ issues, migration, Ukraine, etc.) At the same time, Orbán is committed to reforming, rather than leaving the EU, and continuously seeks allies in support of his endeavors. 

Furthermore, Orbán always finds enough evidence to support his communication that EU institutions and leaders are pressuring the government to abandon its hard stance on migration and gender issues, and support Ukraine’s EU membership aspirations, strengthening his domestic support. Finally, he has proven himself successful in EU decision making. He has achieved important EU concessions, including protecting Hungary’s energy supplies. Additionally, Orbán is amenable to compromise, in December 2023, he agreed to abstain from voting on accession negotiations with Ukraine.

Ukraine and the EU

The conflict surrounding Ukraine’s accession to the EU differs from previous political fights. Most importantly, Ukraine joining the European Union has become of paramount importance to the European Commission and western European governments are deeply convinced that accession is the only right decision. 

Ukraine’s accession has clear antecedents. Since 2009, the country has participated in the Eastern Partnership program and, since 2014, has had an Association Agreement with the EU that includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. However, full membership only became a realistic prospect after Russia’s invasion on February 24, 2022. Key milestones followed: the granting of candidate status on June 23, 2022, and the approval to open accession negotiations, which formally began on June 25, 2024.

So far, not a single thematic chapter has been opened among the 35 required for accession. Formally, progress at any stage demands unanimous consent from all 27 member states, a condition currently unmet due to Viktor Orbán’s resistance. The notion of a “fast-track” membership—absent from the EU Treaties yet favored by many—is intended as a symbolic gesture toward Kyiv, with 2030 often cited as an informal target date. Given that previous candidates, including those from Central and Eastern Europe, required an average of nine to ten years to complete accession, such a timeline appears exceedingly ambitious and unrealistic for a country still at war.

What is the Hungarian PM’s problem?

Hungarian-Ukrainian relations have been strained for nearly a decade, beginning in 2017 when Ukraine adopted an education law that severely restricted the use of minority languages at schools and other public institutions, affecting hundreds of thousands Hungarians living in Transcarpathia. 

Beyond these “personal” grievances, Orbán opposes Ukraine’s ‘fast-track’ EU accession on practical grounds. His key arguments, aside from the fact Ukraine remains at war, focus on the country’s poor state of democracy, the tremendous costs membership would entail, and the affect Ukraine’s large agricultural sector would have on the Common Agricultural Policy budget allocation. Moreover, Orbán has made Ukraine’s prospective membership the central campaign issue for his government ahead of the parliamentary elections next April. Whether this strategy will prove effective remains to be seen, but even a symbolic retreat from this position would carry significant political risks for him.

Taking away Hungary’s veto – simply an unrealistic threat?

How can such a deep division be resolved within EU politics? The unanimity requirement for enlargement is entirely justified and not in question. Nonetheless, statements from key EU officials increasingly allude to the possibility of circumventing Hungary’s veto on crucial matters under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, particularly regarding efforts to accelerate Ukraine’s accession process.

The most straightforward solution would be to introduce qualified majority voting for such matters, although this change itself would require unanimous approval. The proposal aligns closely with broader federalization efforts within the EU. For smaller member states, however, relinquishing the veto in key policy areas would amount to political self-destruction, severely weakening their ability to represent national interests and contradicting the often-invoked principles of a truly democratic EU.

The Commission could also propose, under Article 7(2) TEU, that the European Council unanimously declare a breach of solidarity, arguing that Hungary does not share the efforts of other member states in core issues. This would lead to the suspension of Hungary’s voting right both in the Council and the European Council, another risky, unclear, and controversial move that could easily be rejected by other member states like Slovakia’s Fico, or Czechia’s incoming PM Babis. 

Either path would set dangerous precedents against the interest of the EU and Hungary.  Instead, common sense and realism should prevail, and solutions or compromises should be sought through dialogue at the negotiating table, however difficult they may seem at present.