For Central Europe, the language of sovereignty isn’t an abstract virtue: it is grounded in historical memory. The post-World War II order aimed to make war less arbitrary, enshrining principles such as territorial integrity and the prohibition of wars of conquest in the UN Charter. After the Cold War, these norms were reinforced in Europe through agreements like the Helsinki Final Act and the Budapest Memorandum (1994) – Ukraine even relinquished nuclear weapons in exchange for these guarantees. And yet, it was not enough.

Long before 2022, Kyiv’s internal political developments were subjects of serious debate: corruption, oligarchic influence, and uneven rule of law weakened state capacity. Its rush toward EU and NATO membership was often framed as inevitable, rather than as a calibrated assessment of institutional readiness and alliance interests. These realities do not justify aggression, but they do remind us that sovereignty exists within, not outside of, political conditions.

Still, the core fact remains the same: a sovereign state was attacked, and the system built to prevent this has struggled to respond. The war continues with no clear end in sight. The persistence of the conflict highlights a growing gap between principle and enforcement. International law continues to define the rules, but it does not reliably enforce them when confronted with raw power.

A parallel warning comes from a very different theatre: Venezuela. In early January 2026, a surprise operation led by U.S. forces captured President Nicolás Maduro and brought him to the United States to face criminal charges. President Donald Trump publicly declared that the U.S. would “run the country” until it could be “transitioned” to a new government. While many celebrated the end of a dictator’s rule, the method – military intervention and extrajudicial removal of a sovereign leader – sends a message difficult to ignore: if one power can do this, even for ostensibly justified ends, why not others? The precedent is not lost on Moscow or Beijing.

For Hungary and similar states that ardently defend sovereignty, these examples are a sharp reality check. Invoking sovereignty rhetorically – whether in defense of borders, cultural autonomy, or policy independence – is necessary, but not sufficient. If existing frameworks can be ignored or reinterpreted when inconvenient, and if legal instruments only offer condemnation, then relying on them alone is like building on sand.

Treaties do not stop tanks. Declarations do not deter great powers. Public policy must therefore be grounded in realism. Sovereignty requires strength: credible deterrence, diversified security partnerships, and robust domestic institutions. It requires understanding how power actually works. History shows that states that rely solely on international law and goodwill are often disappointed. The war in Ukraine and the dramatic regime change in Venezuela are indications that sovereignty is no longer guaranteed. If it can be broken anywhere, it can be broken everywhere… and no state can assume it will be the exception.