The President of the Italian Republic is elected for a seven-year term by a joint session of Parliament. Since the Constitution imposes no term limits, a president may be re-elected indefinitely. A presidency can end only in specific circumstances: expiration of term, resignation submitted to the Presidents of both Houses of Parliament, death, permanent incapacity declared through a joint act of Parliament, impeachment for high treason or a breach of the Constitution. In the latter case, a joint session of the Parliament decides by qualified majority, and the decision is referred to the Constitutional Court. The constitution also stipulates that in the event of a vacancy or temporary obstruction of the head of state; the President of the Senate shall act as President of the Republic.
The Fundamental Law of Hungary, on the other hand, imposes a five-year term and only allows re-election once. Termination of office is only allowed by: expiration of term, resignation submitted to the Speaker of the National Assembly, Death, incompatibility declared by the National Assembly, which the Constitutional Court may review upon request, and unworthiness declared by a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly due to conduct unfit to the dignity of the office.
If the presidency becomes vacant, a new president must be elected within 30 days. The Fundamental Law includes precise guidelines in case of a definitive vacancy. If the president is temporarily incapacitated, the Speaker of the National Assembly shall act as President under specific constitutional and statutory provisions governing the duration and cause of the of the incapacity.
In both legal systems, the end of the presidential term is regulated by formal processes designed to guarantee institutional continuity and legal certainty.
In Italy, a President’s resignation take effect upon delivery of a formal declaration addressed to the Presidents of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. In case of permanent incapacity or death, a joint session of Parliament formally recognizes the office vacant. Until a new President is elected, the President of the Senate serves as assumes the duties of acting Head of State. The Italian constitution, however, is silent on the timeline for electing a new president in the case of resignation or the vacancy occurs thirty days before their term expires.
In Hungary, the President’s resignation is submitted to the Speaker of the National Assembly and takes effect upon delivery and the Speaker assumes the role of acting Head of State. Unlike Italy, the constitution clearly establishes a timeline for electing a new president, which must occur within thirty days to ensure constitutional continuity.
Both constitutions contain explicit procedures for temporarily replacing the President and for scheduling an election, thus safeguarding the constitutional machinery.
Although there are differences in institutional guidelines and procedures, both the Italian and Hungarian constitutional arrangements regarding the termination of a presidential mandate are characterized by a strong concern for constitutional safeguarding, judicial oversight, legal certainty, and due process.
The key distinction lies in the procedure following an early termination of the Presidential mandate. In Italy, there is no fixed deadline for electing a new President, whereas Hungary’s Fundamental Law requires a rigid thirty-day deadline. Furthermore, while re-election is possible in both systems, Hungary explicitly limits re-election to one mandate, setting a formal limit to the accumulation of power.
These divergences exemplify distinct approaches to constitutional design within parliamentary republics. However, both systems ultimately uphold Constitutional balance and the smooth transfer of power in cases of vacancy in its highest office.
In conclusion, both Italy and Hungary’s constitution regulates the conclusion of a presidential mandate with provisions that ensure legal continuity and institutional stability. Although both models provide clear procedural frameworks, they are driven by different constitutional logics: Italy is based on flexible parliamentary dynamics, whereas Hungary operates within stricter temporal constraints. Thus, Hungary prioritizes formal control and predictability, while Italy affords a greater discretion to the legislature. These variations show how parliamentary republics can pursue similar aims with constitutionally distinct frameworks.
